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Abstract
In the research presented in this paper, we analyse whether the structure of  the 
political cleavage system in Iceland has changed since 1983, as well as whether 
the impacts of  party-voter linkages and the social structure of  the vote have 
changed between 1983 and 2016/2017. Based on official data and the Icelandic 
National Election Study (ICENES), we find that the rural-urban cleavage and 
left-right cleavage, which are reflected in party polarisation on the left-right 
spectrum, are as important today as previously. Our main results regarding the 
impacts of  party-voter linkages and the social-structure of  the vote is that the 
core bonds of  party identification, left-right distances and the social structure 
of  the vote have weakened over time, whereas the impact of  party sympathy 
has become stronger. This, we argue, reflects that while there has been a gradual 
change in the impact of  party-voter linkages and the social structure of  the vote, 
opening up a space for new parties to succeed, the political cleavage system 
has remained intact. The major change has thus occurred in the bond between 
voters and parties and not in the structure of  party competition in Iceland. 
Keywords: Political cleavages; party-voter linkages; voters’ socio-economic 
status; vote-choice.
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Political cleavages, party voter linkages and 
the impact of voters’ socio-economic status 
on vote-choice in Iceland, 1983-2016/17
Introduction 
In this paper, we analyse the importance of  the rural-urban and left-right cleavages in 
the electoral connection between parties and voters in Iceland, as well as whether those 
cleavages are as present today as they once were. Furthermore, we analyse whether the 
effects of  party-voter linkages and voters’ socio-economic status on vote choice has 
changed in Iceland over time. Regarding the rural-urban cleavage, we analyse whether 
support for various parties in the capital area has changed between 1983 and 2017 using 
official data. The main data source we make use of  otherwise in another analysis is the 
Icelandic National Election Study (ICENES), which covers ten elections. In our analysis 
of  the left-right cleavage, we use party polarisation on the left-right scale as an indicator 
of  the importance of  the left-right cleavage because the more important this left-right 
cleavage is, the more polarised parties will be on the left-right scale (Freire 2008). Re-
garding party-voter linkages, we focus on the impact of  left-right distances, party iden-
tification and party sympathy on the vote. Furthermore, we analyse whether the impact 
of  voters’ socio-economic status on vote-choice has changed in Iceland. 
After 1983, politics in Iceland remained quite stable until 2009, with four established 
parties receiving around 85-90% of  the vote. The global credit crunch hit the Icelan-
dic economy with great force in 2008, causing a collapse of  the financial system and 
protests, and since then, politics have been turbulent (e.g. Önnudóttir et al. 2017). A 
number of  research projects have focused on the impact of  the financial crisis on poli-
tics in Iceland, for example, on electoral behaviour (Indriðason et al. 2017; Önnudót-
tir et al. 2017), protest participation (Bernburg 2016) and trust in politics and society 
(Vilhelmsdóttir & Kristinsson 2018). In this paper, our focus is different. We are, first 
and foremost, interested in analysing and understanding long-term gradual changes in 
electoral behaviour during both the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. We do take into 
consideration, as a context, whether the financial crisis in 2008-09 has accelerated long-
term changes in party-voter linkages in Iceland – but this is not the main focus of  our 
analysis.
1. Parties and voters in Iceland 1983–2016
Historically, there have been four main parties in Iceland, the right-wing Independence 
Party; the Progressive Party, which is a centre party and a former agrarian party; the left-
centre Social Democratic Alliance and the left-socialist Left-Green Movement. In addi-
tion to those four parties, there have usually been one or, at most, two smaller parties 
represented in the parliament. Table 1 shows an overview of  the vote-share of  Icelandic 
parliamentary parties from 1983 to 2017. Until the 2013 election, the four established 
parties usually received a combined share of  85–90% of  the vote in national elections, 
but that changed in 2013. In that election, the established parties received a combined 
vote of  75%, followed by 63% in 2016 and 65% in 2017 (Statistics Iceland 2017a).
Even if  the focus in this paper is long-term gradual changes in electoral behaviour, 
the fact that politics have been turbulent during the post-crisis period cannot be ignored. 






four elections held since 2008, three have been early elections. Net volatility (Pedersen’s 
index) in 2009 was 21%, followed by 38% in 2013, 31% in 2016 and 22% in 2017, while 
the corresponding figures from 1971 to 2007 were typically between 10 and 15%. Data 
from the Icelandic National Election Study (n.d.) (ICENES) show that in 2016, a record 
number of  voters switched parties. In fact, more than half  of  them did so. 
The first early election was held in 2009, when the government was forced to resign 
after the economic crash and months of  protest activity. The next government man-
aged to finish its four-year term, which lasted until the 2013 election. The two latter 
early elections, in 2016 and 2017, were both triggered by political scandals. In 2016, it 
was revealed by the so-called Panama Papers that the Prime Minister at the time and 
his wife had large sums of  money in offshore companies, a fact that he attempted to lie 
about when interviewed about the subject by Swedish National TV (Önnudóttir 2017). 
The scandal that led to the 2017 election was related to an ex-convict’s application for 
a restored honour (Önnudóttir & Harðarson 2017). It was revealed that the father of  
Bjarni Benediktsson, the Prime Minister and leader of  the Independence Party, had rec-
ommended in 2016 that an ex-convict, a child-molester, be granted a restored honour. 
Bright Future, one of  the coalition parties in the government, left the coalition on the 
grounds of  a breach of  confidence when it was revealed that Benediktsson had known 
about this for some time without informing his coalition partners.
Table 1. Vote share of Icelandic parliamentary parties, 1983–2017
% of vote
1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2009 2013 2016 2017
The four established parties:
Independence Party 38.7 27.2 38.6 37.1 40.7 33.7 36.6 23.7 26.7 29.0 25.2
Peoples’ Alliance / Left-Green Movement 17.3 13.3 14.4 14.3 9.1 8.8 14.3 21.7 10.9 15.9 16.9
Progressive Party 19.0 18.9 18.9 23.3 18.4 17.7 11.7 14.8 24.4 11.5 10.7
Social Democratic Party / Social Demo-
cratic Alliance
11.7 15.2 15.5 11.4 26.8 31.0 26.8 29.8 12.9 5.7 12.1
The sum for the four established parties 86.7 74.7 87.4 86.1 95.0 91.2 89.5 90.0 74.9 62.1 64.9
Other parties:
Alliance of Social Democrats 7.3
Women’s Alliance 5.5 10.1 8.3 4.9
Citizens’ Party 10.9
People’s Movement 7.2
Liberal Party 4.2 7.4 7.3
Civic Movement 7.2
Bright Future 8.2 7.2




Others and outside parties (not elected) 0.5 4.2 4.3 1.9 0.8 1.4 3.3 2.8 11.8 5.7 1.5
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Seemingly, the four established parties lost their dominant status after 2009, opening 
up a space for new parties to win elections (Table 1). As already stated there were usually, 
before 2009, one or two smaller parties represented in the parliament, together with the 
four established parties. Only one new party, the Women’s Alliance, managed to sur-
vive through four elections from 1983 to 1999, and only two other parties managed to 
survive two elections, the Liberal Party and the Pirate Party. Since the 2009 election, six 
new parties have managed to win elections, with four of  them, the Pirate Party (centre-
left), the Peoples’ Party (centre-left), the Center Party (centre) and Reform (centre right) 
winning elections in 2017, resulting in eight parties being represented in the parliament, 
which represents a record number of  parliamentary parties in Iceland. 
2. Political cleavages and party-voter linkages in Iceland 1983–
2016/2017
The number of  new parties that have entered the stage (with some of  them having 
ceased to exist) since the 2009 election, begs the question whether those new parties 
are mobilising along the same political cleavages as established parties and whether they 
can therefore be viewed as add-ons to the established cleavage system in Icelandic poli-
tics. The political cleavages we focus on in this paper are the urban-rural cleavage and the 
economic left-right cleavage, which have been found to be the main cleavages in Icelandic 
politics (e.g. Kristinsson 2007; Valen et al. 2000; Hardarson 1995). The success of  new 
parties also indicates that party-voter linkages with the established parties are weaker 
than previously, which may be a result of  both a gradual decline in the strength of  
party-voter linkages since 1983 and a potential realignment of  the party system since the 
financial crisis in 2008-09 (Önnudóttir et al. 2017). 
Party identification, party sympathy and ideological congruence on the left-right 
spectrum all reflect party-voter linkages (e.g. Schmitt 2009; Lachat 2008). Furthermore, 
voters’ socio-economic status has been found to predict vote-choice, reflecting the un-
derlying social structure’s impact on the vote, even if  that impact has seemingly weak-
ened over time (e.g. Dalton 2006). Indeed, the question posed in this paper is whether 
the impact of  these factors on vote-choice has changed. To some extent, political cleav-
ages, party-voter linkages and social structure do overlap, meaning that party-voter link-
ages and social structure may be based on the underlying structure of  political cleavages. 
However, we find it useful to discuss each separately because each reflects a different 
focus on the dynamics of  politics. Political cleavages affect party competition, while 
party-voter linkages and social structure focus on the relationship between party voters 
and the party they vote for. Even if  party-voter linkages and voters’ socio-economic 
status can be based on the structure of  political cleavage system, a change in party-voter 
linkages and the impact of  social structure on the vote does not necessarily indicate that 
there has been a change in the political cleavage system. In other words, the political 
cleavage system may remain stable, even if  the bonds between party-voters and the par-






2.1 Political cleavages in Iceland
The urban-rural cleavage is a conflict between the interests of  urban and rural areas, 
with the largest urban area being in and surrounding the capital, in the South-West of  
Iceland. In 2016, 63% of  Iceland’s sparse voter population (332,529) resided in the 
greater capital area (Statistics Iceland 2017b), with the remainder of  the voters being 
scattered around the country in smaller towns, villages and rural areas. The electoral 
system for national elections plays an important role in sustaining a conflict between 
urban and rural areas. The six constituencies in Iceland are equally divided between the 
capital area, with three geographically small constituencies (Reykjavik North, Reykjavik 
South and South West), and the countryside, with three constituencies (North West, 
North East and South), which covers most of  the country. Historically, the countryside 
has been overrepresented in the Icelandic parliament. After the latest changes in the 
electoral system, which came into the effect with the 2003 election, this disproportion-
ality between the capital area and the countryside was reduced to some extent but not 
eliminated. Since then, the 35–36% of  voters living in the countryside have elected 
between 44 and 48% of  the MPs (e.g. in 2017, 35% of  voters living in the peripheral 
constituencies elected 44% of  the MPs) (Statistics Iceland 2017c). The 2003 change in 
the electoral law was intended to eliminate the disproportionality between the parties, 
but in recent elections, this has not been the case, because the number of  supplementary 
seats1 is too low. 
Table 2 shows the proportion of  voters living in the capital area, the electoral sup-
port of  parliamentary parties in the capital area and, in brackets, the difference in the 
proportions between capital-area voters and the voters for each party from 1983 to 
2017. In general, the patterns of  party support in the capital area seem to have been 
rather stable, with some fluctuations, indicating that no major changes in the rural-urban 
profile of  party voters have taken place over this time period. Since 1983, the Progres-
sive Party has, in general, received proportionally fewer votes in the capital area given 
their support in that area. For example, in 1983 the difference in the support for the 
Progressive Party in the capital areal and the proportion of  voters’ residing there is -27.2 
percentage points, while the corresponding figures for the three other established par-
ties are between -0.8 to 7.4. In earlier years, directly after 1983, the Independence Party 
and the Social Democratic Alliance generally received more support in the capital area, 
whereas the Left-Green Movement received less there. However, the general trend for 
those three parties in later years, moving closer to 2016, has been that their support in 
the capital area roughly reflects the proportions of  voters living there. In general, the 
smaller parties that have been elected have received more support in the capital area, 
with the exception of  the Liberal Party in 2003 and 2007, as well as the Center Party in 
2017.  
The other main cleavage, an economic left-right cleavage, concerns national issues 
regarding the extent to which the government should interfere with the economy and 
the size of  the welfare system (e.g. Bengtsson et al. 2014; Valen et al. 2000; Hardarson 
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Table 2. Parties’ support in the capital area
% voters of parties living in the capital area
1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2009 2013 2016 2017
% % % % % % % % % % %
(diff.)1 (diff.)1 (diff.)1 (diff.)1 (diff.)1 (diff.)1 (diff.)1 (diff.)1 (diff.)1 (diff.)1 (diff.)1
% of voters living in the capital area2 61.3 62.4 63.9 65.6 66.9 63.3 63.5 63.7 64.1 64.9 64.9
The four established parties:
Independence Party 68.8 66.6 73.3 72.2 74.4 70.2 68.8 65.8 65.9 64.6 67.6
(7.5) (4.2) (9.4) (6.6) (7.5) (7.0) (5.3) (2.1) (1.8) (-0.4) (2.7)
Peoples’ Alliance / Left-Green 
Movement
60.6 60.8 56.0 62.6 58.4 59.8 62.1 61.6 67.0 65.8 66.6
(-0.8) (-1.6) (-7.9) (-3.0) (-8.5) (-3.5) (-1.4) (-2.1) (2.9) (0.8) (1.7)
Progressive Party 34.1 44.2 39.1 48.2 46.1 45.5 35.2 44.9 49.0 39.5 43.9
(-27.2) (-18.1) (-24.7) (-17.3) (-20.8) (-17.8) (-28.3) (-18.8) (-15.1) (-25.4) (-21.0)
Social Democratic Party / Social 
Democratic Alliance
64.1 68.8 74.4 74.8 71.5 69.5 68.4 69.8 69.7 57.8 67.7
(2.8) (6.4) (10.5) (9.3) (4.6) (6.3) (4.9) (6.1) (5.6) (-7.1) (2.8)
Other parties:
Alliance of Social Democrats 75.5
(14.1)
Women’s Alliance 88.9 74.8 77.6 79.1









Bright Future 77.3 78.4
(13.2) (13.5)








*Source: Statistics Iceland, see on: https://statice.is/statistics/population/elections/general-elections/. From 1983 to 1999 the capital area are voters 
in Reykjavik constiuency and Reykjanes constituencey. From 2003 to 2016 the capital area are voters living in Reykjavik North constituency, Reykjavik 
South constituency and South-West constituency.
1 Difference between % of  total voters living in capital area and % of  voters of  the party in the capital area
2  With the change of  the electoral system which came into effect in 2003, some of  the areas which had been part of  the greater capital area between 






once was in terms of  explaining both the electoral behaviour of  voters (e.g. Hellwig 
2008) and party politics in modern societies (e.g. Schmitt & Freire 2012). It has been 
argued that other ideological cleavages, such as a liberal-authoritarian cleavage, a mul-
ticultural vs. socially-conservative cleavage or an environmentalist cleavage (e.g. Rosset 
et al. 2016; Bengtsson et al. 2014) have either replaced or supplemented the traditional 
left-right cleavage. Even if  the left-right cleavage may not be as significant as it once was, 
it is still meaningful. It symbolically unites the elected and the electors (Belchior 2013), 
and there are differences in the political values of  voters depending on whether they are 
on the left or the right (e.g. Jost et al. 2008). Furthermore, it has been established that 
voters’ perceptions of  the left-right positions of  parties are associated with the policy 
content of  electoral manifestos (van der Eijk & Schmitt 2010). The issue-space may 
very well have become more complex recently, with the left-right ideology being one 
important layer and additional issues that do not fit the left-right ideological paradigm 
also being on the agenda. Thus, the left-right cleavage is important, but it competes with 
other ideological cleavages. 
The extent of  polarisation on the left-right scale is one indicator of  the degree to 
which parties differentiate themselves along the left-right scale. One argument is that, up 
to a certain extent, the greater party polarisation will make it easier for voters to sort out 
the parties in terms of  left and right and cast their votes for parties that matches their 
own ideological preferences (Schmitt & Freire 2012). Another argument is that the im-
portance of  the left-right cleavage could be reflected in the degree of  party polarisation. 
The greater importance of  the left-right cleavage electorally could provide an incentive 
for parties to diverge along the left-right scale and create a more polarised party system 
(Freire 2008). There are several ways to estimate the degree of  party polarisation (e.g. 
Vegetti 2014; Önnudóttir 2014; Esteban & Ray 1994), and one can use various types of  
data (e.g. voter surveys, candidate surveys or expert surveys). In Figure 1, we plot party 
polarisation in Iceland between 1987 and 2016, using data from the post-election voter 
surveys of  the Icelandic National Election Study2. Voters were asked to place the par-
ties on an 11-point scale from left (0) to right (10). To make this calculation for party 
polarisation, which as an aggregate measure for the party system in each election, we 
use a formula based on Dalton (2008), in which each party’s score is weighted by the 
vote share of  that party3. Figure 1 shows that party polarisation was on a gradual de-
cline, with some fluctuations, between 1987 and 2013, but increased again in 2016. This 
indicates that the Icelandic party system was converging in terms of  left and right until 
2013, which could reflect that the left-right cleavage was weakening in Icelandic politics. 
However, the trend reversed in 2016, when party polarisation increases again. This could 
indicate that the number of  new parties and the weakened status of  the four established 
parties after the 2009 election led to an increase in party polarisation, indicating that the 
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1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2009 2013 2016 
Figure 1. Party polarisation in Iceland, 1987 to 2016
Taken together, the impact of  residency on party vote share seems to have been rather 
stable between 1983 and 2017, indicating that the rural-urban cleavage is as important 
today as it was previously. The curvilinear trend in party system polarisation indicates 
that the left-right cleavage in Icelandic politics is as strong as it was previously, even if  it 
may have decreased to some extent between 1999 and 2009. It can be argued that today, 
parties do compete across those two cleavages to a similar extent that they did before. If  
that is true, the question is why the established parties have lost their former dominant 
status, which was a combined vote share of  around 90%. Additionally, why has there 
been an increase in the number of  new parties in parliament? This could be due to a 
gradual change in the strength of  the impact of  party-voter linkages and social structure 
on the vote, which we will examine in the next section. 
2.2 Party-voter linkages
Party-voter linkages are reflected in the impact of  the left-right distances between par-
ties and voters, party identification with parties, party sympathy and the impact of  vot-
ers’ socio-economic status, on vote choice. As already discussed, these four factors have 
been shown to impact vote-choice, and here, we discuss each one in turn.
Given that left-wing voters vote for parties to the left and right-wing voters vote 
for parties to the right, the impact of  ideology on the vote can be understood in terms 
of  the congruence between voters and parties on the ideological left-right scale. This 






impact of  the ideological distances between parties and voters. In multi-party systems, 
such as in Iceland, which have a number of  parties on the left and a number parties on 
the right, ideological distances can determine party choice on each side of  the spectrum. 
To consider one example, given that a left-wing voter can choose from two or more left-
wing parties, the ideological distance between the voter and the parties on the left side 
of  the spectrum may mobilise the voter to choose a certain party. For the sake of  this 
argument, if  ideology were the only factor determining vote choice, the voter should 
vote for the party that he or she is closest to on the left-right scale. 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012) argue that the increasing complexity of  the 
issue-space and the growing number of  independent voters, meaning voters who shift 
their alliances between parties from one election to the next, has created representa-
tional strain. They find that loyal partisan voters (those who identify with their chosen 
party) are closer to their parties on the left-right scale than non-partisan voters. Rohr-
schneider and Whitfield argue that this representational strain is caused by the pressure 
that parties are faced with about how to represent both loyal, ideologically close voters 
and independent, non-partisan voters. Furthermore, they find that non-partisan voters 
are less likely to be congruent with their party on the left-right scale. Based on this rep-
resentational strain and that the left-right ideology may be of  less importance in modern 
politics, we should find that the impact of  left-right congruence on vote choice is weaker 
today than previously. We hypothesise as follows:
H1: The impact of  left-right distances between parties and party voters on vote-
choice is weaker today than previously.
The other two factors in party-voter linkages that we take into consideration are the 
extent to which voters identify with a party, or partisanship, and the degree to which 
they sympathise with certain parties. Of  these two, party identification and party sym-
pathy, the former can be considered to reflect the core of  how an individual voter views 
politics, and once a voter forms a bond with a party in terms of  party identification, a 
partisan voter will be loyal to that party throughout his or her life (Campbell et al. 1960). 
It is not a given that all voters will identify with a party, but those who do will typically 
remain loyal to that party. 
In ICENES, two questions have been asked regarding whether voters identify with 
a party, one since 1983 (with the exception of  2007) and another since 1999. Both 
show that the proportion of  partisan voters has been on a gradual decline, with some 
fluctuations, since the questions were first asked (Table 3). In 1983, the proportion of  
respondents who considered themselves to be supporters of  a party was 50.2%, but in 
2016, only 29.5% said so. When respondents were asked whether they were close to a 
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Table 3. The proportion of voters who identify with a party, 1983 to 2016
 Party identification
 Supporter of party Close to a party
1983 50.2  
1987 45.8  
1991 40.6  







*In ICENES, there are two questions regarding party identification. Since 1983, with the exception of  2007, all 
respondents have been asked whether they consider themselves to be supporters of  a party, as follows: ‘Many people 
consider themselves supporters of  political parties while others do not feel solidarity with any party. Do you in general 
consider yourself  as a supporter of  any political party or organization?’. Since 1999, as part of  the Comparative Study of  
Electoral Systems that ICENES is a part of, all respondents have been asked whether they consider themselves to be close 
a certain party, as follows: ‘Do you usually think of  yourself  as close to any particular party?’  
Party sympathy differs from party identification in the sense that it should be less resist-
ant to change and can serve as a guide to vote choice for all voters, regardless of  whether 
they identify with a party. Given Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s (2012) argument that 
the number of  non-partisan voters has increased and the issue space is more complex 
than previously, one could expect that party identification now impacts the vote to a 
lesser extent than previously. Instead, party sympathy may have become more impor-
tant in predicting the vote. This could be due to the fact that even if  partisanship has 
declined in importance, voters still make use of  a guide regarding whether they like a 
party or not when making their voting decisions. This could mean that the decline in the 
impact of  party identification on the vote has occurred in tandem with an increase in the 
impact of  party sympathy on the vote. We hypothesise as follows:
H2: The impact of  party identification on vote choice is weaker today as compared 
to previously.
H3: The impact of  party sympathy on vote choice is stronger today as compared 
to previously.
The final factor we take into consideration in this paper is the impact of  voters’ socio-
economic status on the vote, focusing on whether its impact has changed over time. Pri-
or research on the impact of  voters’ socio-economic status on the vote in Iceland finds 
that in general, socio-economic status has had only a weak impact on the vote (Bengts-
son et al. 2014; Hardarson 1995; Þórðarson 2006). However, there are some notable 






for the Women’s Alliance in 1987, 1995 and 1999 (Þórðarson 2006). Secondly, there have 
been differences in voting patterns between rural and urban voters (e.g. Bengtsson et al. 
2014), a point we have already discussed in terms of  an urban-rural cleavage. 
In all studies that have been published regarding the impact of  voter socio-economic 
status on the vote in Iceland, the impacts of  specific socio-economic indicators (e.g. 
gender, age, income, occupation, rural-urban residency and education) have been ana-
lysed separately for each party. Given that there are differences between parties in terms 
of  the impacts of  some of  these factors (for example, some parties have a clear gender 
profile but small or no differences in terms of  education, while voters of  another party 
might have a clear profile in terms of  education but not gender), this could indicate that 
the impact of  voters’ socio-economic status on the vote could have been underesti-
mated in earlier research. In our analysis, we use a new and innovative approach in which 
we combine the impacts of  voters’ socio-economic status, more specifically gender, age, 
marital status, education, occupation, sector, income and rural-urban residency, into one 
indicator of  socio-economic status. In this way, we can estimate the impact of  the social 
structure, specifically voters’ socio-economic status, on vote choice independently from 
the different voter profiles of  the different parties (e.g. some parties have more sup-
port among women, while others have more support among those living in rural areas). 
Given that a number of  research projects have established that there has been a general 
decline in the strength of  the relationship between social characteristics, including voter 
socio-economic status, and vote choice (e.g. Dalton 2006), we assume that a similar 
trend has occurred in Iceland. Thus, we hypothesise as follows: 
H4: The impact of  voters’ socio-economic status on vote choice is weaker today as 
compared to previously.
3. The impact of party-voter linkages and voter socio-economic 
status on vote choice
In this section, we test our hypotheses regarding the impact of  party voter linkages and 
voter socio-economic status on vote-choice. We start by describing the research design, 
data and method, and then, we present our results.
3.1 Research design, data and method 
To test our hypotheses, we use data from the ICENES post-election voter surveys, 
which cover ten elections from 1983 to 2016. The data are stacked (as explained below), 
and we adopt a multilevel binary regression model with two levels. Voters’ evaluations 
of  parties and the impact of  their socio-economic status on the vote is considered at the 
micro-level (the first level), and the election is considered at the macro-level (the second 
level). In each survey, the respondents were asked where they would place themselves 
and the parties on a left-right scale. In 1983, this question was answered using a 3-point 
scale (1=left, 2=middle, and 3=right), and from 1987 onwards, this question was an-
swered using an 11-point scale (0=left, 10=right). In all surveys, the respondents were 
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liked (10) the parties and about their socio-economic background. For all years, except 
1983, we include all parties that were elected to parliament. In 1983, two parliamentary 
parties, the Women’s alliance and the Social Democrats, are not included the analysis, 
because respondents to ICENES were not asked to place those parties on a left-right 
scale or how much they liked those parties. 
For left-right distances we compute the distances between a voter’s self-placement 
on the left-right scale and his or her placement of  the parties. As a part of  this pro-
cedure, we rescale the left-right placement to a scale that ranges from 0 (minimum 
distance) to 1 (maximum distance). For respondents’ party identification, we use two 
question batteries. For data from 1983 to 1995, we use the questions regarding whether 
the respondents consider themselves to be supporters of  a certain party and, if  so, how 
strongly they support that party. From 1999 to 2016, we use the questions whether re-
spondents consider themselves to be close to a certain party and, if  so, how close they 
are to that party4. The follow-up questions regarding the strength of  the support/close-
ness are used to sort out strong party identifiers, who are contrasted with those who 
have a weak party identification, some party identification or no party identification5. 
The reason we contrast these strong party identifiers with the rest is that those who re-
port no, weak or some party identification can be considered to “lean” towards a certain 
party, while those who report a strong party identification can be considered to be the 
“true” identifiers with their party. Regarding party sympathy, we used a question battery 
in which the respondents were asked about the extent to which they liked or disliked a 
party. In our model, we rescaled the data from an 11-point scale to a scale that ranged 
from 0 (dislike) to 1 (like). Regarding respondents’ socio-economic status, we use data 
(registered or asked) concerning their gender, age, marital status, education, occupation, 
income and rural-urban residency, as well as whether they work in the private sector or 
the public sector.
In our analysis, we are interested in explaining whether the impacts of  party-voter 
linkages and voter socio-economic status on vote-choice have changed in recent years. 
Our interest is not in explaining what impacts support for certain parties. Rather, our 
interest is to analyse what impacts vote-choice in general, regardless of  what party voters 
choose. In order to be able to analyse such impacts on vote-choice, we must reconstruct 
our data and use a stacked data-matrix to test our hypotheses. 
Figure 2 shows a hypothetical example of  the transformation of  an original rec-
tangular data matrix with three respondents as cases into a stacked data matrix with 
respondents’ party evaluations as cases. In our example, there are three parties, A, B and 
C, as well as data about respondents’ ages, the distances between their left-right self-
placement and the placement of  three parties (low numbers mean smaller distances) and 
what party they voted for.
Transforming an original dataset into a stacked dataset means that respondents’ eval-
uation of  all the relevant parties is used to predict their vote choice (e.g., van der Eijk et 
al. 1996; van der Brug et al. 2007). In the hypothetical example shown in Figure 2, the 






party. Other party variables, in our example left-right distances, are stacked as well. In 
the stacked data example, the data are sorted by respondent, and there are three rows for 
each respondent (because there are three party stacks). We see that in the original data-
set, Respondent 1 has the shortest distance (1.5) from party A, which is the part that the 
hypothetical respondent voted for, and longer distances from parties B (2.7) and C (2.8). 
In the stacked example, the variable vote choice has been added, which would be the 
response variable if  our goal was to predict vote choice. This new variable (vote choice) 
indicates whether the respondent voted (1) or did not vote (0) for the stack party re-
ported in the party ID. Respondent 1 is coded as 1 for vote choice for the row showing, 
based on party ID, that he voted for Party A, and as 0 for vote choice for Parties B and 
C (also based on Party ID). In the stacked version, Respondent’s 1 left-right distances are 
listed in each row for Parties A, B and C, with the shortest distance being that to Party 
A. By stacking the data in this way, using a single model, we can analyse how respond-
ents’ party evaluations, which are nested within each respondent, such as the left-right 
distances from each of  the relevant parties, affect respondents’ vote choices. Instead of  
limiting the model to estimate the effect of  left-right distances on the choice of  only one 
party at the time, as in an unstacked data matrix, in the environment of  a stacked data 
matrix, we can analyse whether and to what extent left-right distances between voters 
and parties can predict vote choice in general. 
Original data set







1 59 1.5 2.7 2.8 A
2 40 1.4 1.2 1.6 B
3 22 2.2 2.1 1.8 C
Stacked data set






1 59 .33 A 1.5 1
1 59 .02 B 2.7 0
1 59 .12 C 2.8 0
2 40 .30 A 1.4 0
2 40 .45 B 1.2 1
2 40 .03 C 1.6 0
3 22 .02 A 2.2 0
3 22 .01 B 2.1 0
3 22 .10 C 1.8 1
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In our models, party identification and party sympathy are processed into a stacked 
data-set in the same way as left-right distances. We can do this for our three indicators 
of  party-voter linkages (left-right distances, party identification and party sympathy) 
because the respondents evaluated each party separately. Regarding other variables that 
are not party evaluations, such as voters’ socio-economic background, we must adopt a 
different approach. Age, for example, does not vary across party stacks, as can be seen 
in our hypothetical example shown in Figure 2. Respondent 1 is 59 years old regardless 
of  what party he or she voted for. In order to examine the impact of  age on vote choice, 
we must transform it so that it will fit the stacked data matrix. Our approach is to pre-
dict the likelihood of  voting for the party that belongs to each party stack in separate 
regressions for each party stack. This is accomplished by regressing age on vote choice 
(whether the respondent voted for the stack party or not) and saving the result of  each 
of  these regressions as a predicted vote probability (y-hat) that represents each respond-
ent’s probability of  voting for one of  the stack parties. In our hypothetical example, 
shown in Figure 2, three regressions are performed, one for each party, and the y-hat 
for the impact of  age on vote-choice is saved as a new variable. In this way, Respondent 
1 is listed with three different y-hats for age, each reflecting the impact of  age on his or 
her vote choice (with the highest impact being on party A, for which he or she voted).
In our models, we combine the effects of  respondent gender, age, marital status, edu-
cation, occupation, income and rural or urban residency, as well as whether respondents 
work in the private sector or public sector, on party-choice into one y-hat. Given that 
voters of  different parties may have different socio-economic backgrounds, with some 
parties mobilising a rural vote and others receiving more support from those who are 
more highly educated, we obtain a better estimate of  the impact of  voter socio-economic 
status on the vote by combining all socio-economic indicators into one y-hat instead of  
running them separately6. The results of  these regressions can be seen in Appendix I. In 
1983, no questions about income were asked, and thus, income is not a part of  our analy-
sis for that year7. Because the y-hats have different intercepts, we centre them around the 
party means for each year. By centring these y-hats on the party means, we have trans-
formed the measure, allowing it to capture the effect of  social and economic status on 
vote choice and preventing the difference in the intercepts from having an effect.
To sum up, our micro-level variables are the left-right distances between voters and 
parties, party identification, party sympathy and the impact of  voters’ socio-economic 
status on vote choice. We include two variables at the macro level, the year of  the elec-
tion and party age, measured as the number of  years since the party was first elected into 
parliament. Party age is included in order to control for potential bias due to an increase 
in the success of  new parties, which have not had the same opportunity as older parties 
to deepen their bond with voters in terms of  party-voter linkages. In order to test our 
hypotheses regarding whether the impacts of  left-right distances, party identification, 
party sympathy and voter socio-economic background on vote-choice have changed, we 
allow each micro-level indicator to interact with the year of  the election. A statistically 






3.2 Party-voter linkages, voter socio-economic status and vote-choice
Given the structure of  the data, with voters nested within ten elections, we run multi-
level binary logistic regressions with two levels: voters’ evaluations and the impact of  the 
social structure on the vote at the micro level and the year of  the election and party age 
at the macro level. We run three random intercept models. The first model is an empty 
model (Model 1), the second model includes all the main effects (Model 2) and, in the 
third model (Model 3), we add the cross-level interactions between the year of  the elec-
tion and, on the one hand, party-voter linkages and, on the other hand, the impact of  
voter socio-economic status on vote choice (Table 4). Concerning the model fit, using 
BIC as an indicator, a lower BIC indicates a better model fit (Raftery 1995). An absolute 
change of  more than 10 points in BIC between models is a strong evidence that the pre-
ferred model is that with the lower BIC. The difference in BIC between Model 2 and 3 is 
-56.077, indicating that Model 3, which tests whether the impacts of  party-voter linkages 
and voter socio-economic status on vote-choice have changed, is the better fit. In our 
discussion, we focus on the results of  the cross-level interactions observed in Model 3.
Table 4. Changes in impacts on vote choice over time
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B B B
(st.dev.) (st.dev.) (st.dev.)
(Intercept) -1.601*** -25.804*** 94.510***
(0.010) (3.683) (16.743)
Micro-level predictors:
Left-right distances1 -3.397*** 62.819***
(0.116) (21.380)
Party identification2 3.147*** 167.427***
(0.216) (48.374)
Party sympathy3 7.804*** -173.582***
(0.115) (21.700)
















BIC 62003.326 20218.995 20162.918
AIC 61994.191 20159.101 20068.799
Log Likelihood -30996.096 -10072.551 -10023.400
Deviance 61992.191 20145.101 20046.799
Num. obs. 68494 38417 38417
Note: Multilevel binary logistic model. Dependent variable is vote choice. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Programme: R 3.3.2.
1 On an 11-point scale from 0 (no distance) to 1 (maximum distance).
2 On a 2-point scale, 0=no or weak to some party identification and 1=strong party identification
3 On an 11-point scale from 0 (dislike) to 1 (like)
4 Y-hats for the impact of  voters’ socio-economic status on vote-choice, including gender, age, marital status, education, occupation, whether they work 
in the private sector or public sector, income (not included in 1983) and rural urban residency.
5 Ten years: 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2013 and 2016
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In Model 3, the cross-level interactions, which test whether the impacts of  party-
voter linkages and voter socio-economic status have changed over the years, are all sta-
tistically significant. Comparing the Z-values (B/st.dev.), the largest impact is the change 
in the impact of  party sympathy on vote-choice, with a Z-value of  8.27, and the smallest 
change is seen in the impact of  voter socio-economic status, with a Z-value of  -2.45. 
The Z-values for the remaining two cross-level interactions are -3.00 for left-right dis-
tances and -3.42 for party identification. The signs of  the B’s (and the Z-values) indicate 
the directions of  the changes, with a negative sign indicating a weaker impact over time 
and a positive sign indicating a stronger impact. Next, for ease of  interpretation, in Fig-
ures 3–6, we plot the predicted vote-choice probabilities for each cross-level interaction.
Figure 3 shows the changes in the impact of  left-right distances on vote choice from 
1983 to 2016, specifically that the impact of  left-right distances weakens over time. The 
probability of  respondents voting for the party closest to them (e.g. no distance between 
the respondent and the placement of  the party on the left-right scale) was lower in 2016 
than it was in 1983. Even if  this change does not seem to be very substantial, it still 
supports our hypothesis (H1) that the impact of  left-right distances on vote-choice has 
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Figure 3. Changes in impact of left-right distances on vote choice
When contrasting those who have a strong party identification with those who have no, 
weak or some party identification, the impact of  strongly identifying with a party ap-
pears to weaken over time (Figure 4), supporting our hypothesis regarding a decrease in 
the impact of  party identification (H2). In 1983, the probability of  a respondent voting 
for a party which he or she strongly identified was over 75%, whereas by 2016, this value 
had fallen beneath 25%. At the same time and unsurprisingly, the impact of  having no, 
weak or some party identification on vote choice remained weak over the time period 

















































Figure 4. Changes in the impact of party identification on vote choice
The last variable we tested regarding party-voter linkages is party sympathy. We find 
that its impact also changed over time, but in the opposite direction as that of  left-right 
distances and party identification. The impact of  party sympathy on the vote became 
stronger over time, whereas the impacts of  left-right distances and party identification 
became weaker. In Figure 5, eyeballing the change in predicted probabilities based on the 
impact of  party sympathy, depending on the year of  the election, we see that such change 
occurred among those who either strongly liked a party or were close to strongly liking it, 
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Plotting the changes in the effect of  voters’ socio-economic status on vote choice, we 
contrast the low impacts of  socio-economic status (which are one standard deviation 
below the mean impacts), the mean impacts and the high impacts (one standard devia-
tion above the mean) over time (Figure 6). Recalling that in our models, the impact of  
voter socio-economic status on vote choice is based on the predicted probabilities of  
voter socio-economic background on party choice, which are combined into one y-hat 
for each respondent for each year, the interpretation of  the data becomes slightly more 
cumbersome as compared to interpreting the impacts of  voter socio-economic status 
in general. Figure 6 shows that the differences in the impacts of  the socio-economic 
profiles of  party-voters, become smaller over time. In 1983, the differences in the pre-
dicted probabilities of  voting for a certain party depending on the impacts of  voters’ 
socio-economic background on party choice, are bigger compared to 2016. We also see 
that the largest change seems to have occurred among those for whom the impact of  
socio-economic status is above average (high impact), with a steeper downward slope as 
compared voters experiencing a mean or low impact on the part of  socio-economic sta-
tus. Our focus here is on whether, in general, the impact of  voter socio-economic status 
on vote-choice has changed, not changes in individual indicators. However, we did re-
peat the model (Model 3 in Table 4), testing whether the impact of  each factor (gender, 
age, marital status, education, occupation, whether the respondent worked in the private 
or public sector, income and rural or urban residency) on vote-choice had changed over 
the years. We found that those factors whose impacts have changed, have changed in 
the same direction as our combined indicator. That is, they have become weaker. The 
results of  those models are presented in Appendix III. However, we conclude here that 
Figure 6 clearly shows that in general, the impact of  voter socio-economic status on vote 
choice has weakened over time, as we hypothesised (H4). 
 
The impact of voters‘ socio-
ecnomic status:  
Low impact, -.08 (1.st.dev. below mean) 
Mean impact, ≈.0  



































The question raised in this paper is whether the decrease observed in support for the 
four established parties (the Left-Green Movement, Social Democratic Alliance, Pro-
gressive Party and Independence Party) and following increase in the number of  new 
parliamentary parties can be explained by a gradual change in the structure of  political 
cleavages and/or a gradual change in party-voter linkages and the social structure of  
the vote. Covering the time period from 1983 to 2016/2017, our main results suggest 
that the structure of  the political cleavage system, in terms of  the rural-urban cleav-
age and the left-right cleavage, as reflected in party polarisation, has not changed to a 
considerable extent, whereas we find that the effect of  party-voter linkages and voter 
socio-economic status on vote choice has changed. 
In terms of  party-voter linkages, we find that the impacts of  left-right distances be-
tween voters and parties, as well as party identification, on the vote have weakened. This 
indicates several things. First, it may be that even if  the left-right cleavage is as impor-
tant in politics as it once was (at least in terms of  party polarisation), voters’ ideological 
bonds with the parties they can vote for have become weaker. This could also indicate 
that voters today are more willing to vote for a party that is not necessarily close to them 
on the left-right scale. Another potential explanation for the weaker effect on the part 
of  left-right distances, which offers a clear avenue for a future research, is the increase in 
the number of  new parties, which means that voters are less familiar with the placement 
of  those parties on the left-right scale and thus such placement has a weaker impact. The 
weakening impact of  party identification on vote choice means that parties cannot count 
on the support of  loyal partisan voters to the same extent as they previously could. It 
can be argued that this, together with the change in the impact of  left-right distances on 
the vote, reflects representational strain, as discussed by Rohrschneider and Whitfield 
(2012), meaning that the Icelandic parties are faced the challenge of  representing both 
their loyal partisan voters and, at the same time, mobilising the votes of  an increasing 
number of  independent voters. 
Partisan voters are thought to be those who form strong bonds with their parties 
in terms of  party identification and typically remain loyal to these parties throughout 
their lives. As elsewhere (e.g. Rohrschneider & Whitfield 2012), we find indicators that 
lower proportion of  voters are forming these strong bonds with a party. For this reason, 
we argue that party sympathy, or the extent to which voters like or dislike a party, has 
replaced party identification as a determinant of  the vote to some extent. This argument 
is two-fold. First, party sympathy does necessarily reflect a strong partisan bond be-
tween voters and parties, even if  it is almost a given that partisan voters like their parties. 
Second, those voters who do not strongly identify with a party still form some type of  
bond with a party or some parties. Given our findings that the number of  partisan vot-
ers (those who are strong party identifiers) is decreasing and the impact of  strong party 
identification on vote-choice has weakened over time, an increase in the impact of  party 
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the increase in the effect of  party sympathy on vote choice is, among other things, due 
to it replacing the impact of  party identification on vote-choice. 
We also analysed whether the social structure of  the vote, as in the impacts of  voter 
socio-economic status on vote-choice, changed between 1983 and 2016. Our findings 
indicate that socio-economic status is less important today than it was previously in this 
regard. As discussed in our paper, prior research has found that voter socio-economic 
status has, in general, had a weak impact on the vote in Iceland. Using a different ap-
proach, one based on the argument that voters of  different parties have different socio-
economic profiles (e.g., with some parties mobilising the rural vote, while others have a 
clear gender profile), we combined the effects of  various socio-economic status varia-
bles into one indicator reflecting the social structure of  the vote. By using this approach, 
we could analyse whether the impact of  the social structure on the vote has changed, 
and as already stated, we find that in Iceland, it has decreased. However, in order to 
unpack exactly what drives these changes, e.g., whether it is residency, education or age 
or whether some specific events may have impacted these changes, one would need to 
analyse each indicator and consider each election separately, which is beyond the scope 
of  this paper.  
Our findings indicate that party-voter linkages and the impact of  social-structure on 
the vote have changed over the 33 years (1983 to 2016) covered in this paper. However, 
the political cleavage system seems to have remained rather stable given that the main 
cleavages are the rural-urban cleavage and the left-right cleavage. That indicates that the 
changes in the link between parties and voters are not due to a change in the structure of  
the cleavage system. Party competition is structured based on the underlying rural-urban 
and left-right cleavages to a similar extent today as before. Even if  we do not exclude the 
possibility that the issue-space has become more complex, the rural-urban and left-right 
cleavages still structure party competition in Iceland. Thus, old and new parties alike 
face the challenge of  mobilising both partisan and independent voters along those cleav-
ages and perhaps operating within an issue-space that has become more multi-layered. 
Notes
1 The number of  parliamentary representatives allocated to constituencies are partly based on the 
number of  inhabitants in each constituency, however there can be no fewer than six MPs (Kristins-
son 2007). Supplementary seats are allocated to make the number of  parliamentary seats propor-
tional to the party‘s share of  national vote, but are linked to constituencies by law (Hardarson & 
Kristinsson 2010).The allocation of  supplementary seats have not eliminated disproportionality 
between the capital area and the rest of  the country, even if  that would be possible to do by law. 
2 Respondents were asked to place the parties on an 11-point scale from left (0) to right (10). In 
1983, the question about the left-right placement of  the parties was posed using a different scale, 
specifically a 3-point scale from left (1) to right (3), and for that reason, we leave that year out of  the 
calculation of  party polarisation in Iceland. 
3 The polarisation of  the party system is calculated using the following formula derived from Dalton 
(2008): SQRT {(party vote sharei)*([party L-R scorei – party system average L-R score]/5
2}, where 
i represents individual parties and L-R stands for left-right. 






the ‘closeness question’ from 1999 and onwards. First, from 2007 onwards, the follow-up question 
about the strength of  support was omitted. Second, the question regarding how close the respond-
ent is to a party has only been asked since 1999. Thus, regarding the strength of  party identification, 
we were forced to use the two separate questions for those two time periods (1983 to 1995 and 1999 
to 2016).
5 The follow-up questions for both types of  questions (‘supporter of  a party’ and ‘close to a party’) 
were posed using a three-point scale, from low support/not very close to strong support/very 
close. Based on these question batteries, we create a new variable to represent the strength of  party 
identification on a 2-point scale, in which 1 indicates those who strongly identify with a party and 0 
indicates those how either have no, weak or some party identification).
6 By combining the predictive power of  all the socio-economic indicators, we sum together the ef-
fects of  respondents’ socio-economic status, instead of  analysing each indicator in turn. In this way, 
we prevent the piling up of  error terms that could occur if  we created one y-hat for each socio-
economic indicator.
7 We repeat the analysis presented in Model 3 in Table 4 with an indicator of  the impact of  voters’ 
socio-economic status, excluding income, on vote-choice for all years, and the results are similar (see 
Appendix II). 
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In Tables A1 to A10 we present the results of  the binary logistic regressions we used to 
create the indicator (predicted probabilities) for the impact of  voters’ socio-economic 
status on party-choice. The regressions are done for each party and within each election 
year. Gender is coded as 1 if  male and 0 of  female. Age and income (income not asked 
in 1983) are continuous variables. Marital status is coded as 1 if  respondent is married 
or living as married and 0 if  else. For education we use two dummy variables where 
we contrast those who have primary education with those who have either completed 
secondary education or university education. For occupation we create three dummy 
variables with those who are manual-workers are contrasted with farmers/farm workers, 
non-manual workers and those who are or have not been in the workforce. For sector 
we contrast those who work in the public sector with those who work in the private sec-
tor or are not working – however see footnote for A3 how sector is handled in 1991. For 
residency we contrast those who live outside the capital area (the rural constituencies) 
with those who live in the capital area constituencies.
A1. Voters’ socio-economic status and party-choice in 1983
Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig.
Male 0.15 .881 0.64 .520 0.59 .558 1.51 0.132
Age -1.00 .317 1.61 .107 2.74 .006 0.77 0.439
Married/living as married 0.94 .348 -1.59 .113 0.89 .375 -1.22 0.222
Education, reference category: University 
education
Primary education -0.60 .551 0.53 .598 0.44 .663 0.37 0.714
Secondary education -0.76 .444 1.45 .146 -0.52 .603 -1.84 0.066
Occupation, reference category: manual 
workers
Farmers / farm workers -1.52 .129 4.82 .000 -3.17 .001 -0.96 0.336
Non-manual workers 0.83 .408 0.48 .631 -2.88 .004 0.42 0.674
Not in the workforce 0.12 .904 0.02 .986 0.00 .999 -0.01 0.995
Sector, reference category: public sector
Private sector 2.15 .031 -2.05 .040 2.84 .005 -2.57 0.010
Not in the workforce 0.23 .818 -0.11 .912 0.00 .999 -0.16 0.877
Lives outside capital area 1.84 .066 5.51 .000 -0.76 .448 -1.22 0.221
Constant -4.22 .000 -5.06 .000 -3.09 .002 -3.29 0.001
N
Nagelkerke R Square
*Response variable: voted for party in model
Social Democratic 
Party
Progressive Party Independence Party Peoples' Alliance
.04 .19 .05 .05
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A2. Voters’ socio-economic status and party-choice in 1987
Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig.
Male 0.21 .831 0.03 .979 2.56 .010 0.85 0.393 0.82 0.41 -5.57 .000
Age 1.01 .314 0.96 .336 1.22 .222 0.18 0.856 0.56 0.57 -1.74 .082
Married/living as married 0.44 .660 0.36 .717 0.01 .989 -0.05 0.960 0.12 0.91 -0.08 .933
Education, reference category: University 
education
Primary education 1.13 .259 0.38 .703 -0.29 .771 -2.40 0.017 2.35 0.02 -1.69 .090
Secondary education 0.33 .740 0.57 .572 -0.63 .531 -1.41 0.159 0.53 0.60 0.42 .672
Occupation, reference category: manual 
workers
Farmers / farm workers -2.03 .042 3.43 .001 -1.45 .146 -1.18 0.237 0.62 0.54 -0.79 .431
Non-manual workers 0.77 .439 1.08 .281 -2.33 .020 1.43 0.153 -0.06 0.95 -0.66 .509
Not in the workforce 0.40 .691 1.23 .217 -2.12 .034 0.69 0.493 1.22 0.22 0.60 .548
Sector, reference category: public sector
Private sector 0.91 .365 0.39 .696 2.16 .031 -3.00 0.003 0.52 0.61 -1.36 .174
Not in the workforce 0.30 .762 -0.42 .673 2.87 .004 -1.29 0.196 -1.51 0.13 -1.21 .227
Income, reference category: third tercile of 
income (highest)
First tercile of income (lowest) -1.17 .240 0.26 .797 -1.78 .076 1.63 0.102 -0.89 0.37 0.93 .354
Second tercile of income (middle) -0.46 .643 0.90 .370 -0.92 .359 -0.41 0.679 -0.17 0.86 1.09 .278
Lives outside capital area -0.30 .762 4.81 .000 -1.85 .064 0.94 0.346 -2.63 0.01 -3.10 .002
Constant -5.18 .000 -5.98 .000 -3.10 .002 -3.14 0.002 -5.02 0.00 -0.37 .709
N
Nagelkerke R Square
*Response variable: voted for party in model
1105 1105 1105 1105 1105




Progressive Party Independence Party Peoples' Alliance Citizen Party Womens' Alliance
A3. Voters’ socio-economic status and party-choice in 1991
Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig.
Male 0.27 .789 0.29 .774 3.58 .000 0.70 0.484 -6.10 0.00
Age 0.07 .941 1.18 .239 1.32 .186 0.35 0.727 -1.70 0.09
Married/living as married -0.50 .614 0.09 .930 0.13 .896 1.11 0.267 -1.27 0.20
Education, reference category: University 
education
Primary education 1.18 .239 2.45 .014 0.47 .642 -2.29 0.022 -1.83 0.07
Secondary education 1.14 .254 2.49 .013 -0.10 .920 -1.46 0.144 -1.38 0.17
Occupation, reference category: manual 
workers
Farmers / farm workers 0.00 .998 1.90 .057 -1.97 .049 0.55 0.582 -1.83 0.07
Non-manual workers 0.47 .642 0.44 .663 -2.48 .013 1.37 0.171 -1.38 0.17
Not in the workforce -0.06 .954 -0.83 .406 1.15 .251 1.24 0.215 0.47 0.64
Private sector1 -0.84 .398 0.35 .728 1.81 .071 0.91 0.364 -0.23 0.82
Income, reference category: third tercile of 
income (highest)
First tercile of income (lowest) -1.13 .259 0.29 .773 -1.90 .057 2.59 0.010 0.24 0.81
Second tercile of income (middle) -1.33 .184 0.86 .390 -2.53 .012 1.98 0.047 1.81 0.07
Lives outside capital area -1.39 .166 5.17 .000 -5.01 .000 3.31 0.001 -1.98 0.05
Constant -3.51 .000 -6.27 .000 -1.61 .108 -5.68 0.000 0.55 0.58
N
Nagelkerke R Square
*Response variable: voted for party in model
1 In the reference group are those who work in the public sector or are not part of the workforce. 
.03 .11 .10 .05 .19
906 906 906 906 906
Social Democratic 
Party






A4. Voters’ socio-economic status and party-choice in 1995
Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig.
Male 3.38 .001 0.48 .630 0.21 .836 0.85 0.398 -2.06 0.04 -4.83 .000
Age -0.61 .544 -0.33 .738 1.01 .310 0.19 0.847 -0.28 0.78 0.54 .588
Married/living as married -0.97 .333 0.81 .417 0.84 .398 -0.28 0.780 -1.01 0.31 1.82 .068
Education, reference category: University 
education
Primary education 0.06 .951 1.81 .071 -0.09 .925 -0.37 0.708 -0.18 0.86 -2.46 .014
Secondary education 0.15 .878 1.20 .229 -0.07 .943 -0.31 0.753 -1.29 0.20 -0.54 .586
Occupation, reference category: manual 
workers
Farmers / farm workers -0.73 .463 1.43 .154 -1.00 .316 0.04 0.965 0.00 1.00 0.49 .626
Non-manual workers -0.57 .569 -0.55 .584 -0.67 .505 0.71 0.478 0.24 0.81 0.33 .744
Not in the workforce 0.00 .999 0.00 .999 0.00 .999 0.00 0.999 0.00 1.00 0.00 .999
Sector, reference category: public sector
Private sector -1.01 .312 1.34 .180 1.46 .144 -2.95 0.003 -1.56 0.12 0.63 .531
Not in the workforce 0.00 .999 0.00 .999 0.00 .999 0.00 0.999 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.000
Income, reference category: third tercile of 
income (highest)
First tercile of income (lowest) -1.94 .052 0.40 .689 0.12 .908 1.36 0.173 0.37 0.71 1.06 .289
Second tercile of income (middle) -0.20 .838 0.11 .911 -0.61 .540 0.77 0.439 -0.04 0.97 1.05 .294
Lives outside capital area -4.06 .000 5.12 .000 -1.91 .056 1.32 0.188 1.28 0.20 -3.65 .000
Constant -3.05 .002 -5.69 .000 -3.02 .003 -4.47 0.000 -3.29 0.00 -3.80 .000
N
Nagelkerke R Square
*Response variable: voted for party in model
Social Democratic 
Party
Progressive Party Independence Party Peoples' Alliance Peoples' Movement Womens' Alliance
.07 .07 .02 .03 .05 .16
1113 1113 1113 1113 1113 1113
A5. Voters’ socio-economic status and party-choice in 1999
Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig.
Male -4.31 .000 1.21 .226 1.98 .048 -0.11 0.909 2.58 0.01
Age 3.06 .002 -1.79 .074 -1.78 .076 0.13 0.895 2.46 0.01
Married/living as married -0.50 .618 -0.59 .555 1.30 .194 -0.65 0.518 0.30 0.76
Education, reference category: University 
education
Primary education -3.75 .000 1.70 .089 2.13 .033 -0.07 0.942 0.40 0.69
Secondary education -3.44 .001 2.50 .012 1.94 .052 -0.33 0.745 -0.26 0.80
Occupation, reference category: manual 
workerse
Farmers / farm workers -1.79 .073 2.13 .033 -1.41 .158 1.31 0.191 -0.15 0.88
Non-manual workers 2.20 .028 -0.34 .733 -2.19 .028 0.10 0.924 0.25 0.80
Not in the workforce 0.70 .487 0.00 .998 0.66 .512 -0.13 0.898 0.00 1.00
Sector, reference category: public sector
Private sector -2.22 .026 1.90 .058 1.24 .216 -1.57 0.117 1.69 0.09
Not in the workforce -1.30 .195 0.00 .998 -1.70 .089 1.19 0.235 0.00 1.00
Income, reference category: third tercile of 
income (highest)
First tercile of income (lowest) 1.79 .073 1.07 .284 -2.35 .019 -0.99 0.323 0.45 0.65
Second tercile of income (middle) 1.55 .120 1.56 .118 -2.08 .037 -1.56 0.119 1.54 0.12
Lives outside capital area -0.06 .952 6.04 .000 -4.52 .000 1.35 0.178 -1.18 0.24
Constant -2.80 .005 -6.45 .000 -0.28 .781 -4.09 0.000 -7.18 0.00
N
Nagelkerke R Square
*Response variable: voted for party in model
1019 1019 1019 1019 1019
.10 .14 .09 .04 .09
Social Democratic 
Alliance
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A6. Voters’ socio-economic status and party-choice in 2003
Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig.
Male -4.20 .000 0.79 .431 2.78 .005 -0.12 0.905 1.72 0.09
Age -0.10 .916 -0.29 .770 0.38 .703 -1.56 0.119 0.65 0.52
Married/living as married 0.83 .407 -0.32 .750 -0.62 .533 -0.50 0.618 0.45 0.65
Education, reference category: University 
education
Primary education -1.56 .120 1.12 .265 1.34 .181 -0.93 0.352 0.11 0.91
Secondary education -0.03 .974 -0.49 .625 1.48 .140 -1.24 0.216 -0.94 0.35
Occupation, reference category: manual 
workers
Farmers / farm workers -1.75 .081 3.55 .000 -2.17 .030 2.15 0.031 0.00 1.00
Non-manual workers 0.99 .322 -0.01 .991 -2.55 .011 1.14 0.253 0.25 0.80
Not in the workforce 0.00 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00 1.00
Sector, reference category: public sector
Private sector -1.94 .053 0.96 .339 2.69 .007 -3.06 0.002 0.24 0.81
Not in the workforce 0.00 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00 1.00
Income, reference category: third tercile of 
income (highest)
First tercile of income (lowest) 0.38 .701 -1.08 .280 -1.84 .066 2.02 0.043 1.86 0.06
Second tercile of income (middle) 1.13 .259 0.62 .538 -2.50 .013 1.01 0.312 0.69 0.49
Lives outside capital area -1.98 .047 4.25 .000 -1.81 .070 0.14 0.892 -0.57 0.57
Constant -0.43 .666 -4.88 .000 -2.92 .004 -2.94 0.003 -5.88 0.00
N
Nagelkerke R Square
*Response variable: voted for party in model
843 843 843 843 843
.08 .11 .07 .09 .04
Social Democratic 
Alliance




A7. Voters’ socio-economic status and party-choice in 2007
Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig.
Male -4.53 .000 0.31 .755 4.40 .000 -2.27 0.023 3.00 0.00
Age 1.74 .082 -0.84 .399 0.68 .497 -2.11 0.035 1.02 0.31
Married/living as married 1.46 .143 0.38 .703 -2.00 .045 0.13 0.895 0.31 0.76
Education, reference category: University 
education
Primary education -2.61 .009 2.95 .003 1.55 .121 -1.77 0.076 0.27 0.79
Secondary education -2.46 .014 -0.48 .635 2.99 .003 0.14 0.888 0.09 0.93
Occupation, reference category: manual 
workers
Farmers / farm workers -0.79 .428 1.19 .233 -0.64 .522 1.29 0.197 0.00 1.00
Non-manual workers 1.80 .072 -0.38 .701 -1.36 .173 0.09 0.926 1.27 0.20
Not in the workforce 0.00 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00 1.00
Sector, reference category: public sector
Private sector -0.63 .528 -1.41 .159 1.87 .061 -1.01 0.315 0.54 0.59
Not in the workforce 0.00 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00 1.00
Income, reference category: third tercile of 
income (highest)
First tercile of income (lowest) 0.54 .591 0.27 .787 -3.50 .000 2.83 0.005 0.82 0.41
Second tercile of income (middle) 0.21 .835 0.54 .590 -3.59 .000 1.93 0.053 2.30 0.02
Lives outside capital area -1.43 .153 6.11 .000 -0.70 .486 -1.07 0.285 -1.53 0.13
Constant -2.45 .014 -6.32 .000 -2.20 .028 -2.21 0.027 -6.47 0.00
N
Nagelkerke R Square
*Response variable: voted for party in model
.07 .19 .10 .08 .15
808 808 808 808 808
Social Democratic 
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A8. Voters’ socio-economic status and party-choice in 2009
Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig.
Male -1.92 .054 1.84 .066 0.34 .733 -0.31 0.756 0.56 0.57
Age 2.09 .037 0.34 .735 0.23 .820 -1.07 0.286 -2.32 0.02
Married/living as married 0.55 .585 -0.47 .636 -0.72 .469 -0.49 0.626 1.46 0.14
Education, reference category: University 
education
Primary education -0.12 .906 1.08 .279 -0.03 .974 -0.83 0.407 -1.73 0.08
Secondary education -0.74 .457 0.71 .475 0.16 .873 -0.89 0.373 0.14 0.89
Occupation, reference category: manual 
workers
Farmers / farm workers 0.00 .998 0.05 .962 0.35 .728 1.85 0.064 0.00 1.00
Non-manual workers -0.09 .932 -0.52 .602 -0.60 .547 0.56 0.576 1.05 0.29
Not in the workforce 0.43 .666 0.47 .641 0.41 .681 0.16 0.870 -1.96 0.05
Sector, reference category: public sector
Private sector -0.26 .792 1.66 .097 2.46 .014 -2.91 0.004 0.33 0.74
Not in the workforce -1.26 .209 -0.58 .560 0.19 .853 0.79 0.429 1.54 0.12
Income, reference category: third tercile of 
income (highest)
First tercile of income (lowest) 0.13 .899 -1.62 .105 -1.19 .233 -1.07 0.283 1.80 0.07
Second tercile of income (middle) 0.42 .677 -0.09 .925 -0.64 .525 0.00 0.999 1.53 0.13
Lives outside capital area -2.62 .009 4.61 .000 0.12 .902 -1.35 0.178 -2.87 0.00
Constant -3.32 .001 -6.11 .000 -4.29 .000 -1.75 0.081 -3.47 0.00
N
Nagelkerke R Square
*Response variable: voted for party in model
.05 .08 .02 .05 .09
926 926 926 926 926
Social Democratic 
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A9. Voters’ socio-economic status and party-choice in 2013
Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig.
Male 0.11 .911 0.38 .701 1.60 .110 -2.60 0.009 0.27 0.79 1.82 .069
Age 2.30 .022 -1.96 .050 1.40 .160 0.65 0.517 -1.43 0.15 -2.47 .014
Married/living as married 0.76 .450 -0.30 .766 1.69 .091 0.33 0.744 -0.32 0.75 -1.56 .118
Education, reference category: University 
education
Primary education -2.28 .022 3.39 .001 0.20 .844 -2.10 0.036 -1.20 0.23 -0.34 .735
Secondary education -2.15 .032 1.80 .071 1.11 .265 -1.24 0.215 -1.38 0.17 0.09 .926
Occupation, reference category: manual 
workers
Farmers / farm workers -1.00 .315 1.69 .090 -2.57 .010 2.38 0.018 0.00 1.00 0.00 .998
Non-manual workers 0.42 .672 1.64 .101 -2.65 .008 -0.49 0.625 0.86 0.39 -0.08 .935
Not in the workforce 1.29 .196 -0.05 .963 -1.41 .158 0.07 0.944 0.54 0.59 0.90 .369
Sector, reference category: public sector
Private sector -2.42 .016 0.11 .911 3.44 .001 -1.72 0.085 0.91 0.36 -0.83 .408
Not in the workforce -1.44 .149 0.01 .993 1.73 .084 -0.35 0.724 -0.20 0.84 -1.14 .253
Income, reference category: third tercile of 
income (highest)
First tercile of income (lowest) 0.52 .606 -1.03 .304 -1.17 .240 0.72 0.472 0.47 0.64 1.31 .189
Second tercile of income (middle) 0.34 .732 -0.49 .625 -3.44 .001 1.73 0.084 0.99 0.32 0.78 .435
Lives outside capital area -1.61 .106 5.20 .000 1.41 .158 0.34 0.736 -4.02 0.00 -1.28 .200
Constant -4.49 .000 -3.85 .000 -5.25 .000 -3.65 0.000 -3.01 0.00 -2.40 .016
N
Nagelkerke R Square
*Response variable: voted for party in model
874 874 874 874 874 874
.06 .13 .11 .07 .10 .13
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A10. Voters’ socio-economic status and party-choice in 2016
Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig. Z Sig.
Male 0.66 .510 1.57 .117 1.42 .155 -3.38 0.001 -1.16 0.25 2.61 .009 -1.01 .310
Age 2.97 .003 1.96 .050 1.18 .240 -0.06 0.953 -1.04 0.30 -5.25 .000 1.73 .084
Married/living as married -0.34 .735 1.15 .248 1.91 .056 -1.28 0.200 1.70 0.09 -0.36 .719 -0.09 .932
Education, reference category: University 
education
Primary education -2.71 .007 2.22 .027 0.72 .470 -0.89 0.372 -1.51 0.13 0.02 .982 -0.06 .954
Secondary education -1.59 .112 0.65 .514 1.77 .077 -0.02 0.987 -1.93 0.05 -0.18 .857 0.04 .972
Occupation, reference category: manual 
workers
Farmers / farm workers 0.00 .998 0.14 .886 -0.69 .490 -0.23 0.815 1.78 0.08 -0.62 .536 0.53 .597
Non-manual workers -0.87 .382 -1.94 .052 -0.36 .715 -0.74 0.458 1.54 0.12 1.43 .154 -0.33 .744
Not in the workforce 0.31 .753 -2.07 .039 0.20 .841 -0.29 0.773 1.94 0.05 0.15 .878 -1.13 .258
Sector, reference category: public sector
Private sector -0.50 .620 0.37 .710 -3.35 .001 2.40 0.016 -0.11 0.92 0.18 .855 -0.68 .494
Not in the workforce -0.64 .520 1.52 .129 -0.94 .348 -0.07 0.941 -1.90 0.06 1.19 .233 -0.40 .686
Income, reference category: third tercile of 
income (highest)
First tercile of income (lowest) -0.60 .545 0.45 .655 -1.09 .276 0.82 0.414 0.02 0.99 0.27 .785 -1.47 .141
Second tercile of income (middle) -0.32 .752 0.68 .496 -1.54 .122 1.20 0.230 0.81 0.42 0.98 .325 -1.13 .259
Lives outside capital area 0.92 .359 3.74 .000 2.90 .004 -0.92 0.359 -3.32 0.00 -1.38 .167 -1.49 .135
Constant -5.13 .000 -7.40 .000 -5.02 .000 -2.46 0.014 -2.84 0.00 -1.04 .300 -3.67 .000
N
Nagelkerke R Square
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In A11 are the results of  a multilevel binary logistic regression model. This is the same 
model as in Model 3 in Table 4, but with income excluded all years from the indicator 
about the impact of  voters’ socio-economic status on vote-choice. 
A11. Multilevel binary logistic regression with income excluded from the indicator 
































Note: Multilevel binary logistic model. Dependent variable is vote-choice. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p 
< 0.1. Programme: R 3.3.2.
1 On an 11 point scale from 0 (no distance) to 1 (maximum distance).
2 On a 2 point scale, 0=no or weak to some party identification and 1=strong party identification
3 On an 11 point scale from 0 (dislike) to 1 (like)
4 Y-hats for the impact of  voters’ socio-economic status on vote-choice, including gender, age, marital status, education, 
occupation, whether they work in the private sector or public sector and rural urban residency.
5 Ten years: 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2013 and 2016
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Appendix III
A12 lists the results of  multilevel binary logistic regressions, where the impacts of  each 
factor in voters’ socio-economic status is tested separately. 
A12. Impacts of separate indicators of voters’ socio-economic status on vote-
choice, 1983 to 2016
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
(Intercept) 108.162*** 108.192*** 108.120*** 106.619*** 104.220*** 100.384*** 108.707*** 110.383***
(14.423) (14.422) (14.427) (14.463) (14.481) (14.575) (14.430) (14.458)
Micro-level predictors:
Left-right distances1 51.199*** 51.206*** 51.189*** 51.522*** 50.563*** 50.753*** 49.272*** 49.786***
(18.618) (18.619) (18.620) (18.619) (18.640) (18.664) (18.611) (18.666)
Party identification2 140.118*** 140.127*** 140.023*** 139.053*** 136.815*** 138.685*** 140.294*** 137.745***
(41.299) (41.297) (41.308) (41.151) (41.135) (40.876) (41.307) (40.925)
Party sympathy3 -189.589*** -189.614*** -189.563*** -188.457*** -190.777*** -187.286*** -194.140*** -192.080***















Lives outside capital area4 13.473
(71.137)
Macro-level predictors:
Year5 -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.055*** -0.053*** -0.058*** -0.058***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Party age6 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cross-level interactions:
Year*left-right distances -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.027***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Year*party identification -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.067***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
Year*party sympathy 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.101*** 0.100***















Year*lives outside capital area ≈-0.005
(0.036)
BIC 26937.741 26937.822 26938.219 26935.031 26925.568 26907.325 26935.714 26729.440
AIC 26840.670 26840.752 26841.149 26837.960 26828.498 26810.254 26838.643 26632.385
Log Likelihood -13409.335 -13409.376 -13409.574 -13407.980 -13403.249 -13394.127 -13408.322 -13305.193
Deviance 26818.670 26818.752 26819.149 26815.960 26806.498 26788.254 26816.643 26610.385
Num. obs. 50242 50242 50242 50242 50242 50242 50242 50168
Note: Multilevel binary logistic model. Dependent variable is vote-choice. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Programme: R 3.3.2.
2 On a 2 point scale, 0=no or weak to some party identification and 1=strong party identification
3 On an 11 point scale from 0 (dislike) to 1 (like)
4 Y-hats for the impact of  separate indicators for voters’ socio-economic status on vote-choice, gender, age, marital status, education, occupation, whether 
they work in the private sector or public sector, income (not asked in 1983) and rural urban residency.
5 Ten years: 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2013 and 2016
6 Years since party was first elected into parliament
